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Abstract
Human beings do not observe the world from the outside, but rather are fully
embedded in it. The sciences, however, often give the observer both a “god’s eye”
perspective and substantial a priori knowledge. Motivated by W. Ross Ashby’s state-
ment, “the theory of the Black Box is merely the theory of real objects or systems,
when close attention is given to the question, relating object and observer, about what
information comes from the object, and how it is obtained” (Introduction to Cyber-
netics, 1956, p. 110), I develop here an alternate picture of the world as a black box to
which the observer is coupled. Within this framework I prove purely-classical analogs
of the “no-go” theorems of quantum theory. Focussing on the question of identifying
macroscopic objects, such as laboratory apparatus or even other observers, I show
that the standard quantum formalism of superposition is required to adequately rep-
resent the classical information that an observer can obtain. I relate these results
to supporting considerations from evolutionary biology, cognitive and developmental
psychology, and artificial intelligence.
Subject Classification: 03.65.Yz; 04.60.Bc
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The theory of the Black Box is merely the theory of real objects or systems,
when close attention is given to the question, relating object and observer, about
what information comes from the object, and how it is obtained.
— W. Ross Ashby, 1956 ([1], p. 110)
1 Introduction
Modern science is built on two far-reaching ideas: that there is a way that the world works,
and that we human beings are not separate from but are rather part of the world. The
first idea matured in the 17th and 18th centuries, reaching its full expression—but by no
means widespread acceptance—in Laplace’s concept of a mechanical, fully-deterministic
universe. The maturation of the second idea did not begin until the birth of modern
biology and psychology in the mid-19th century, and it is not yet complete. While both
biology and psychology firmly place human beings and other organisms within the world,
and while the enormous progress made in these disciplines during the past 50 years allows
the construction of increasingly-sophisticated models of human beings and other organisms
as systems that acquire information from their environments and use that information to
act on their environments, “the observer” and her alter ego, “the experimenter” still stand
outside of our most basic physical theories.
The fundamental fact required to incorporate the observer/experimenter (hereafter, in keep-
ing with tradition, simply “the observer”) into physical theory has, however, been recog-
nized for well over a century. It was first formally elucidated by Boltzmann in the 1880s:
reducing uncertainty by acquiring information requires the expenditure of energy. The
minimal energetic cost of acquiring and recording one bit, i.e., the answer to one yes/no
question, is known: it is ln2 kT , where k is Boltzmann’s constant and T is temperature
[2, 3, 4]. However, k is small, k ∼ 1.38 × 10−23 J/K in SI units, so at physiological tem-
perature, T = 310 K, the minimal per-bit energetic cost ln2 kT ∼ 3 × 10−21 J is vastly
smaller than typical macroscopic energies. This tiny value for the per-bit energetic cost of
observation justified the traditional ideal, implicit in classical physics, of the “detached”
observer whose observational activities had no impact on the observed world.
When, almost 50 years after Boltzmann’s discovery, the early development of quantum
theory introduced a formalism in which observation did impact the world—collapsing wave
functions and even determining whether entities would behave as waves or particles—this
violation of the ideal of detachment quickly assumed metaphysical proportions. From the
remarkable Solvay Conference of 1927 [5] onwards, debates about the physical meaning of
the quantum formalism have remained largely metaphysical (for synoptic reviews, see [6, 7];
for recent surveys of interpretative positions, see [8, 9, 10]). Physicists regularly deplore
this situation, with Fuchs, for example, likening interpretative stances to religions [11] and
Cabello labelling the entire interpretative landscape a “map of madness” [12]. Nonetheless,
substantial numbers of physicists—perhaps most famously, Bell [13]—maintain that the
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observer and the process of observation can play no role in any theory, and in particular no
role in any physical theory, describing a world that worked in whatever way it worked long
before humans existed and will continue to work in that way long after humans are gone.
Even physicists who embrace some form of what Fuchs [14] has called, following Wheeler
[15], “participatory realism” may insist, as Fuchs himself has done, that physics can provide
no theory of the observer [11]. If physics can offer no theory of the observer, however, the
observer still stands outside of physics, whether as a “participant” or not.
We know, however, what observers do. Observers acquire information and, in their com-
plementary role as actors on their environments, they create information. Biology and
psychology tell us, in ever increasing detail, how they acquire information and how they
act to create more of it. Hence observation, together with its complement, experimentation,
is a process of information exchange between an observer and that observer’s environment.
Both the observer and the observer’s environment are parts of the world, and if the “envi-
ronment” is expanded to become the observer’s complement, the two together constitute the
world. Boltzmann’s insight then tells us that any exchange of information between observer
and environment involves an exchange of energy, and hence a physical interaction, between
observer and environment. This simple consideration renders the detached observer a mere
approximation, one that may be expected sometimes—and possibly always—to fail.
That the idealization of the detached observer must be rejected even on classical-physics
grounds is, of course, not a new idea: it is a cornerstone of second-order cybernetics.
von Uexku¨ll [16], von Foerster [17], Kampis [18], Koenderink [19] and many others have
argued for it explicitly. Ro¨ssler’s concept of endophysics [20] is based on it. The critical
question in any theoretical framework that rejects the detached observer is that of how the
“epistemic cut” [21] separating the observer from the observed environment is defined, and
in particular, whether it is defined in a way that truly places the observer within the world.
As Kampis puts it, “what endophysics aspires for is the study of the encompassing big
black box of which the observer and his epistemology are a part ... an enclosed observer is
bound to the same laws as those of the system observed” ([18], p. 265). As von Neumann
recognized [21], the observer being “bound by the same laws” is assured if the position of
the cut is arbitrary (cf. Pattee, “The cut itself is an epistemic necessity, not an ontological
condition” [22], p. 13). If the observer is “special” in some way, so that the observer-
environment boundary cannot be “erased” within the theory without affecting the behavior
of the world—as it appears to be the case, for example, in the endophysical framework of
Kauffman and Gare [23]—then the observer remains in an important sense outside of the
theory.
Classical cybernetics provides us with a simple formal model of the information exchange
between the observer and the observed environment: the theory of the Black Box. My
goal in this paper is to take seriously both the Black Box model and the requirement that
the epistemic cut be arbitrary and to see where these assumptions jointly lead. What is
offered here is, therefore, not a new model of observation, but rather an exploration in
some depth of an old model of observation conjoined with an even-older general constraint
on model construction. After reviewing the Black Box model and the associated epistemic
3
cut in the next section, I show that conjoining the Black Box model with an arbitrarily-
movable cut leads to “no-go” theorems, i.e., theorems limiting the inferences that may be
drawn from either theoretical considerations or observational outcomes, that are classical
analogs of no-go theorems familiar from quantum information theory. I then show that if
a classical black-box world is assumed, by hypothesis, to comprise a collection of bounded,
causally-independent “objects”, finite observations can only identify superpositions of such
objects. The classical Black Box model with an arbitrary epistemic cut thus requires
us to view even a classical world in quantum-theoretic terms. The traditional “classical
worldview” of bounded, independently-observable and independently-manipulable objects
only emerges when we ignore the constraints of the Black Box model and assume that
observers have a priori knowledge and local causal power that the Black Box model—and
indeed, the formalisms of both quantum and classical physics—tell us that observers cannot
obtain. To place this result in a larger context, I briefly discuss ideas and observations
from evolutionary biology, cognitive and developmental psychology, computer science and
artificial intelligence that point toward this same conclusion. I close by suggesting that if
observers and observation are placed firmly within the world, its theory of the world is the
only theory of the observer that physics needs. The observer only steps out of physical
theory—and indeed, out of the physical world—when physics contradicts itself, granting
to the observer knowledge and causal power that physics itself tells us no worldly observer
can have.
2 The Black Box Model
The Black Box model is a formal representation of the interaction between an observer and
the system being observed. This section reviews the informal notion of a “system” with
particular emphasis on the assumption of separability. It then presents the Black Box model
and provides reasons for believing that it accurately describes the interactions between ob-
servers and physical systems. It briefly discusses the relation between the sense of observer
dependence entailed by the Black Box model and the informal notion of “subjectivity” with
which it is sometimes associated.
2.1 Systems and Separability
The terms ‘universe’ and ‘world’ are here used interchangeably to denote the maximal closed
system containing all possible observers and all possible observed systems as components.
Here ‘closed’ has the usual meaning of not interacting with any other system. As observation
requires interaction, any closed system is unobservable; the universe, as a closed system, is
therefore unobservable. Setting special relativity aside for simplicity, the ‘observed world’
or ‘environment’ of any observer can be regarded as the complement of that observer within
the world. In this case, given any arbitrary choice of observer, that observer together with
that observer’s environment jointly compose the world (taking special relativity into account
converts this complement into a light cone).
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The terms ‘system’ and ‘physical system’ are here used interchangeably to denote a com-
ponent of the world, not a mathematical or other formal model of such a component as is
sometimes intended by other authors. A “system” in the latter, formal-model sense can be
stipulated. A system in the sense employed here can only be observed and/or acted upon,
after which a model of that system may be constructed or stipulated. The term ‘compo-
nent’ is here used informally; it can be made precise by stipulating a physical model of the
universe which is then decomposed. If the universe is represented by a classical configu-
ration (or phase) space, decomposition is implemented by the Cartesian product operator
×, while if the universe is represented by a Hilbert space, decomposition is implemented
by the tensor product operator ⊗. In either case, the factors into which the universe is
decomposed represent systems as defined here. The Black Box model is a model of the
interaction between observers and systems, i.e., a model of the interaction between two
components of the world, an observer (which is always itself a system) and a system (which
may itself also qualify as an observer).
The usage employed here may be compared to that recently employed by Kitto [24]. It
is consistent with the idea that a system is “a set of entities that are interacting via a
set of relationships” ([24], p. 542), provided that the entities and relationships referred
to are components and characteristics, respectively, of the world, as opposed to models,
approximations, or simplifications of such components or characteristics. The current usage
differs, however, from that of Kitto in that it does not assume that a system is “separate
from its surroundings” ([24], p. 541). In particular, it does not assume that a system is
separable from its surroundings as this term is employed in physics, i.e., it does not assume
that a system occupies or can be assigned a state independently of the state occupied by
or assigned to its surroundings. As discussed in detail below, this latter provision allows
the observer-system boundary to be moved arbitrarily without altering the composition or
the behavior of the world, i.e., of the composite system comprising the observer plus the
observed system.
Separability is an intuitively appealing and quite natural assumption; hence rejecting it from
the outset can be regarded as radical. Separability is, however, despite its intuitive appeal an
assumption, indeed (as will be shown below) a very strong one. While failures of separability
are typically identified (by definition) with entanglement in the quantum theory literature,
moreover, they can arise in multiple formal and interpretative contexts. Tipler, for example,
has shown that requiring classical dynamics to be strictly deterministic reproduces the
formalism of unitary quantum theory and hence entails non-separability [25]; indeed he
shows that the “quantum potential” required for strict classical determinism is identical
to the “guiding field” of Bohmian quantum mechanics [26]. While Bohm interpreted this
guiding field as non-local, however, Tipler interprets it as strictly local. In a similar vein,
Rosen [27] formalizes the notion of a constraint hierarchy in classical complex systems
proposed by Polanyi [28], showing that it can be represented as an arbitrarily extended
hierarchy of potential functions. Rosen concludes, “a complex system requires an infinite
mathematical object for its description ... it is quite clear that there is no such thing as
a set of states, assignable to such a system once and for all” ([27], p. 190, emphasis in
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original). Here again we have a failure of separability in a classical context, one to which
the quantum-theoretic concept of entanglement would ordinarily be thought irrelevant.
Separability is closely associated with contextuality, i.e., with the potential dependence
of system behavior on how, in what setting, or with what preparations measurements
are made. Kitto [24] distinguishes three kinds of contextuality: dependencies of system
components on each other, dependencies of system behavior on how it is measured, and
dependencies of system behavior on the environmental setting. The distinctions between
these types of contextuality depend, however, on the assumption of separability. If the
components of a separable system are non-separable, the first kind of contextuality appears
as Kitto describes ([24], p. 551); similarly if a system S is not separable from the apparatus
employed to measure its state, but the joint system S′ comprising S plus the apparatus
is separable from its environment, the second kind of contextuality appears. If, however,
the assumption of separability is dropped altogether, all three kinds of contextuality can
appear and they cannot be distinguished. As shown in detail in §3 below, if a system cannot
be bounded, its components cannot be identified; ipso facto they cannot be distinguished
from components of the apparatus, the environment, or for that matter, the observer.
Here the distinction between the identification of components—something that must be
accomplished by observation—and the stipulation of components within an hypothesized
model (and hence the fundamental distinction between systems and models) is clearly
essential.
By not assuming separability as an a priori condition on systems, the present analysis
permits arbitrary contextuality. As shown in §3 below, an arbitrarily-movable epistemic cut
renders the possibility of such contextuality inescapable. Potential effects of contextuality
may in practice be ignored, i.e., simply assumed not to exist as they often are, but the
consequences of doing so cannot be predicted and may be severe.
2.2 Definition of the Black Box
A black box as described by classical cybernetics [1] is a system to which observers have
only exterior access. They can form hypotheses about what is going on inside the box, they
can formulate and test by further observation models of what is going on inside the box,
but they cannot disassemble the box, examine its interior workings, and determine by such
observations the dynamics that the box executes.
An observer interacts with a black box by sending it strings of bits; traditionally this
interaction is considered to involve turning dials, pushing buttons, and so forth. The black
box, in turn, sends the observer strings of bits, e.g., by moving pointers on dials or changing
the numbers in a digital display. The observer-box interaction is considered to take place
in episodes, i.e., the observer does something to the box, waits for a certain period for the
box to respond, and then does something else. The box may respond by doing nothing.
The observer may also do nothing, in hopes of observing spontaneous behavior on the part
of the box.
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The observer is assumed to be a finite system with finite energy resources. The finite
energetic cost of encoding each bit limits the observer to sending only a finite number of
bits to the box, and to recording only a finite number of bits from the box, in each of a
finite number of episodes of interaction. The lengths of these “input” and “output” bit
strings can be considered the “resolution” of the inputs to and outputs from the box. For
simplicity, the input and output resolutions are considered to be identical. In this case, the
information exchange between observer and box can be considered a classical information
channel [29] with a fixed capacity equal to the resolution. Again for simplicity, this classical
information channel can be considered to be noise-free. The consequences of relaxing the
restriction to finite communication through this classical channel is discussed in §3.3 below.
Nothing prevents the observer from sending the same input to the box multiple times;
similarly, nothing prevents the box from sending the same output to the observer multiple
times. If the channel capacity and hence the resolution of the inputs and outputs is small
and the number of episodes of interaction is large, such repetitive behavior is inevitable.
The observer is assumed to be capable of observing her own inputs to the box, and to
have a memory on which both the input sent and the output received in each episode are
both written. Because the number of interaction episodes is finite, this memory is finite.
It is assumed for simplicity that the observer’s memory is sufficient to record all of the
interaction episodes; this assumption is discussed further in §3.3 below. The observer can
be considered to consult the memory in order to frame hypotheses about the box’s behavior
and to freely choose, based on these hypotheses, what input to send to the box in the next
episode. The meaning of “freedom” in this context is also discussed in §3.3 below.
These descriptions, characterizations and assumptions can be formalized with the following:
Definition: A black box is a system about which no observer can have more (non-hypothetical)
information than is contained in a finite list of finite-length bit strings representing observed
input-output transitions.
The interaction between the observer and the box can be represented as in Figure 1a.
The observer collects finite data about the behavior of the box “from the outside” and uses
these data—the only data that are available—to understand and frame hypotheses about
the box’s internal structure and dynamics and to use these hypotheses to predict the output
that will be produced by the box in response to each input.
2.3 The Black Box as a Model of Physical Systems
As indicated by the opening quotation, Ashby considered all “real objects or systems” to be
black boxes, or at least to become black boxes as their structures and behaviors were probed
at finer and finer resolutions. Opening the case of a laptop computer—or increasingly, even
the engine compartment of an automobile—reveals within merely an arrangement of fully-
encapsulated parts, “components” with internal structures hidden from the user. Such
components are black boxes by design, meant to be installed within the larger system
without modification and to be fully interchangable with replacements having the same
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Figure 1: The Black Box model and two related concepts. (a) An observer interacts with a
black box by exchanging information with the box through a classical channel of fixed, finite
capacity; (b) The “environment as witness” formulation of decoherence permits observers
to access information about a physical system only via the mediation of a surrounding
environment; (c) Decompositional equivalence requires an observer’s interactions with a
composite system to be independent of the placement of subsystem boundaries within that
system.
input-output behavior without affecting the performance of the larger system. Further
investigation of such components reveals that they too contain components. Even when a
component is easily recognizable and “simple”—perhaps it is a machine screw or a wire—it
is still possible to ask what internal structure explains its properties or behavior. However,
at some point such questioning stops, leaving whatever components that remain black
boxes.
Probing any physical system deeply enough reveals structure and behavior only adequately
describable using quantum theory. It is here that the black-box nature of physical systems
becomes explicit. As Bohr repeatedly emphasized, in making measurements of the behavior
of a quantum system one is inevitably forced to make use of macroscopic instruments.
One must interact, in other words, with a macroscopic composite system comprising the
quantum system of interest together with the apparatus used to measure its behavior.
No independent access to the quantum system is possible. This lack of independent access
renders the quantum system a black box. In addition, the physical coupling of the quantum
system of interest to the apparatus blurs the boundary between the two, a blurring that
is formalized as entanglement by the unitary time evolution of the Schro¨dinger equation.
As Bohr put it, “it is no longer possible sharply to distinguish between the autonomous
behavior of a physical object and its inevitable interaction with other bodies serving as
measuring instruments, the direct consideration of which is excluded by the very nature of
the concept of observation in itself” ([30], p. 290).
It is important here to emphasize that characterizing a quantum system—or any system—
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as a black box is making a statement about observational access to that system. It is
straightforward to write down precise formal models of many quantum systems in either
mixed or pure states and to claim, on the basis of such a model, that a system is well
understood. Observing a model, however, is not the same thing as observing a system.
Arbitrarily precise models can be constructed for any black box, and they can accurately
predict some finite number of observations or not. The existence of such a model, however,
has no bearing on whether the system being modelled is a black box. A system is a black
box if and only if it satisfies the definition given above, i.e., if and only if it is a system
about which no observer can have more (non-hypothetical) information than is contained in
a finite list of finite-length bit strings representing observed input-output transitions. The
statements of Ashby and Bohr quoted above are statements about observational access, not
statements about the possibility of model construction.
In the Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg that became the standby of
“textbook” quantum theory (e.g., [31]; see also [32]), it is the amplification of signals
indicating the presence of quantum phenomena by a directly coupled macroscopic appa-
ratus that converts the fragile information contained in quantum states into the robust,
recordable classical information of observational outcomes. The more modern, though by
now almost 50 years old, version of this view is the theory of environmental decoherence
[33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40], in which exposure to and hence entanglement with any
macroscopic environment, intentional or not, converts quantum information into classical
information. Ollivier, Poulin and Zurek introduced the “environment as witness” formu-
lation of environmental decoherence [41, 42], later elaborated as the theory of “quantum
Darwinism” [43, 44, 45, 46, 47] or “quantum state information broadcasting” [48, 49, 50, 51]
in recognition of the fact that observers typically obtain information about physical systems
by interacting with the surrounding environment, typically the surrounding ambient pho-
ton field. This more recent formulation of environmental decoherence makes it explicit that
observers are not directly coupled to the systems that their observational outcomes purport
to describe, but are rather directly coupled to an intervening environment—effectively a
very large apparatus—comprising vast numbers of unobserved degrees of freedom.
Central to the environment as witness formulation and quantum Darwinism is the require-
ment that environmental encodings of quantum states be redundant in the sense that many
observers at different locations can each obtain the same information about the system of
interest without disturbing either the interaction of the system with its environment or the
information accessed by the other observers (cf. [42], Figure 1 and surrounding discussion).
This redundancy requirement prevents observers from accessing information about the sys-
tem by any means other than through the environment, as any such access would disturb
the system and hence destroy the redundancy of the encoding [52, 53]. The redundancy
requirement, in other words, makes the environment a black box, a container that prevents
direct observational access to any systems contained in its interior (Fig. 1b). If observa-
tions of quantum systems satisfy the constraints imposed by the environment as witness
formulation of decoherence, therefore, they can be characterized as interactions with a black
box.
9
The theoretical framework of environmental decoherence assumes “no-collapse” or unitary
quantum theory, i.e., quantum theory in which there is no physical process of quantum
state collapse and hence no physical violation of unitarity [54]. Unitary quantum theory
applies, however, only to closed systems. As first explicitly recognized by Everett [55], this
restriction of unitary evolution to closed systems has two important consequences: (1) the
universe, being a closed system, must evolve unitarily; and (2) the universe can contain no
closed systems, as the absence of interactions between such systems and their surround-
ings would permit violations of unitarity. The environmental decoherence framework is
explicitly designed to cope with the openness of all possible systems to interaction—and
hence to observation—that is implied by point # 2. Schlosshauer, for example, remarks
when introducing the decoherence framework that “over the past three or so decades it
has been slowly realized that the isolated-system assumption—which, as we have described
above, had proved so useful in classical physics and had simply been taken over to quantum
physics—had in fact been the crucial obstacle to an understanding of the quantum-to-
classical transition” ([40], p. 3–4).
If unitary quantum theory is correct, then there are no physically classical systems, only
apparently or “for all practical purposes” (FAPP; terminology due to Bell [13]) classical
systems. Alternative theories in which unitarity is physically violated have been proposed,
and are sometimes (incorrectly) regarded as “interpretations” of quantum theory as opposed
to alternative theories; examples include the theories of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [56],
Penrose [57] or Weinberg [58]. In such theories, there are physically classical systems.
However, these theories have at present no empirical support (e.g., [54, 59, 60]) and are
increasingly challenged by theoretical approaches such as holography that invoke quantum
theory at very large scales (e.g., [61, 62, 63]) and by derivations of quantum theory from
purely information-theoretic foundations (see Section 3.4 below). This situation presents
at least a prima facie challenge to any theoretical approach that assumes or implies the
existence of physically-classical systems. Kitto, for example, remarks that in at least some
cases “measurement merely records reality; it does not influence what is found during that
measurement” while cautioning that “such assumptions, while sometimes correct, can be
markedly dangerous” ([24], p. 547). If unitary quantum theory is correct, such assumptions
maybe useful in some circumstances, but they are never correct in the strong sense of
accurately describing reality. If the universe indeed exhibits large-scale entanglement as
unitary quantum theory would imply, regarding “the notion of separability to be key to the
definition of a system” ([24], p. 542) results in a universe without systems.
2.4 The Epistemic Cut and Decompositional Equivalence
The universality of the Black Box model for physical systems is, however, also supported
by theoretical considerations far more fundamental than decoherence. As noted earlier,
both classical and quantum physics represent the states of physical systems as vectors
in state spaces, the real configuration (or phase) space in classical physics and the com-
plex Hilbert space in quantum physics. The product operators that implement state-space
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factorization and its inverse, state-space combination are in each case associative, i.e.,
A × B × C = (A × B) × C = A × (B × C) in classical physics and A ⊗ B ⊗ C =
(A⊗B)⊗C = A⊗ (B ⊗C) in quantum physics. Both theories, moreover, represent inter-
actions between systems by linear operators, specifically Hamiltonians. These operators are
additive, i.e., H(A×B) = HA+HB+HAB in classical physics and H(A⊗B) = HA+HB+HAB
in quantum physics, where in each case the final term HAB represents the A − B interac-
tion. In both theories, therefore, decomposing a system into two or more components makes
no difference to the composite system’s structure or behavior. The epistemic cut between
components is, in this case, purely epistemic as Pattee [22] requires; where it is placed
makes no difference to the composite system. An observer interacting with the composite
system cannot tell, either by characterizing its state space or by measuring its dynamics,
that it has been decomposed into components. Both the boundaries between the internal
components and the interactions defined at these internal boundaries are invisible to an
outside observer. The composite system is, from the outside observer’s perspective, a black
box within which its components are fully contained (Figure 1c). In describing quantum
Bayesianism, Fuchs employs phenomenological language to make this point, referring to
the “hermetically sealed” character of a black-box world as “interiority” and attributing an
inviolable interiority to all systems, large and small ([11], p. 20).
The invisibility of internal component boundaries to outside observers, previously termed
decompositional equivalence [64], has significant consequences for decoherence and particu-
larly for quantum Darwinism [65, 66, 67]. If the classical information acquired by outside
observers of a composite system does not depend on the placement of subsystem bound-
aries within that system, then it cannot depend on interactions defined at those boundaries.
Observers of an environment cannot, therefore, determine the boundaries of systems embed-
ded within that environment given only classical information encoded by that environment.
Any such encoding is arbitrarily ambiguous about the boundaries of embedded systems.
Multiple observers can interact with the same, redundant encoding, hypothesize radically
different system-environment boundaries, and infer radically different system states as a
result. They can agree completely about the observational outcomes they have obtained,
but disagree about both the system and the system-environment interaction that produced
them. This principled ambiguity about the states of internal systems extends even to
whether they are coherent, i.e., entangled, or environmentally decohered, a phenomenon
termed “entanglement relativity” [68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75].
The goal of observation is to determine the state space and the dynamics, i.e., the self-
Hamiltonian, of the system being observed. The classical Black Box model, the environ-
ment as witness formulation of decoherence, and the formal constraints imposed on either
quantum or classical physics by decompositional equivalence all locate the physical interac-
tion that implements observation at a single boundary: the boundary between the observer
and the observed composite environment, i.e., between the observer and the entire rest of
that observer’s observable universe. The physical interaction at this boundary implements
the classical information channel between the observer and the composite environment that
is that observer’s observed world. Only information that flows through this classical chan-
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nel contributes to observational outcomes. The observer can hypothesize, on the basis of
these observational outcomes, the existence of internal boundaries within the composite en-
vironment and hence internal structure and interactions within the observed world. These
hypotheses can only be tested, however, by examining their consequences for the observed
world as a composite whole, because the observed world as a whole is the only system with
which the observer directly interacts.
2.5 Observer Dependence and “Subjectivity”
A Black Box model of the observer-environment interaction entails a precise sense of ob-
server dependence: each decomposition of the universe into an observer and that observer’s
environment is unique, so each observer observes a unique environment. It thus extends the
observer-relativity of quantum states common to Everett’s “relative state” interpretation
[55], Rovelli’s “relational” interpretation [76] and Fuch’s quantum Bayesianism [11] to an
observer-relativity of quantum systems (cf. Zanardi [68] where observer-relative systems are
already taken for granted and Dugic´ and Jeknic´ - Dugic´ [70, 71] where they are discussed
explicitly). Moreover, each observer’s observational capabilities—in quantum-theoretic lan-
guage, the observables that each observer is capable of deploying—are exactly specified by
the observer-environment interaction Hamiltonian. Decompositional equivalence entails
that this sense of observer dependence is shared by classical and quantum physics. Many
authors from von Uexku¨ll [16] onwards have emphasized that observation is, by its very
nature, observer-dependent in this way.
The sense of observer dependence implied by the Black Box model, and hence the model it-
self, is often criticized as subjectivist or even solipsist. Fuchs responds to the charge of
solipsism with characteristic vigor: “No agent, no outcome for sure, but that’s not solip-
sism: For, no system, no outcome either!” ([11], p. 19, Fig. 5 caption). What the observer
is capable of observing is determined by the observer-environment interaction (i.e., the
Hamiltonian HOE), and in the limit of a very large environment, primarily by the internal
dynamics of the observer (i.e., by HO). However, what the observer actually observes at
any given instant—the output delivered by the black box in response to any given input—is
determined by the environment (i.e., by HE). This is “subjectivity” in the sense that an
observer can only observe what she is capable of observing, but it is not “subjectivity”
in the (typically pejorative) sense of an observer that observes only what she expects to
observe or, worse yet, only what she wants to observe. As Moore [77] so clearly emphasized,
the essence of the Black Box model is the ever-present possibility of surprise.
“Subjectivity” in the sense entailed by the Black Box model is, moreover, consistent with
FAPP intersubjectivity and hence FAPP objectivity. Two very similar observers embedded
in a very large world in such a way as to make their respective environments and hence
their respective observer-environment interactions very similar can be expected to record
very similar observational outcomes. If the bandwidths of their respective information
channels and hence their effective measurement resolutions are small, their outcomes as
recorded may even be identical. Observer dependence does not mean that agreement about
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outcomes is impossible. It rather means, as discussed in more detail in §3 and §4 below,
that such agreement can carry no ontological weight. Nothing the observers can do can
guarantee that their observations are caused by the same system; indeed the Black box
model entails that their observations are caused by different systems, by their own unique
and distinct, albeit very similar, environments. Each observer has, by definition, her own
personal umwelt [16], and every observation she makes is constrained by it.
3 No-Go Theorems for Black Boxes
“No-go” theorems restrict the inferences that observers can make from either theory or ob-
servations. If the Black Box model indeed provides a general description of observational
interactions with physical systems, it should provide no-go theorems that impose the same
restrictions on inferences from theory or observations that the familiar no-go theorems of
quantum information theory impose. This section shows that this is indeed the case.
3.1 Moore’s Theorem (1956)
Edward Moore proved, in 1956, the fundamental no-go theorem for observers of black boxes
([77], Theorem 2):
Theorem (Moore, 1956]): Finite observations of a black box are insufficient to determine
its machine table.
The “machine table” of a black box is the list of all possible input-output transitions of the
black box. The finite list of observed input-output transitions accumulated by an observer
of some black box B is at least a partial machine table of B. Moore’s theorem shows that
no such partial machine table can be demonstrated to be complete. Hence it prohibits
the inference of a complete machine table from any finite list of observed input-output
transitions, and hence from any model based on such a list, no matter how long this list
may be.
Proof (Moore, 1956): Given any partial machine table T obtained by finite observation of
some black box B, it is possible to construct arbitrarily many hypothetical machine tables
that contain T . These constructed machine tables correspond to black boxes with larger
state spaces than the minimal black box BT required to generate T . Because any of these
larger black boxes could have generated T , nothing about T is sufficient to determine that
the observed black box B is BT , i.e., nothing about T is sufficient to determine that T is
the complete machine table of B. 
Moore’s theorem shows that the very next output from any black box can be a complete
surprise. Any black box could, for example, contain a clock that counts to some large
number, after which it enables the execution of a qualitatively different dynamics than that
executed previously; alarm clocks, time bombs, commonplace computer programs and many
biological systems are obvious examples. A significant special case to which this applies
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is that of “tests for contextuality” such as discussed by Kitto [24]; no finite sequence of
observations during which a system appears to behave in a non-contextual way provides
any guarantee that the system will not behave in a contextual way in the future. One can
appeal to Occam’s razor and hypothesize that the behavior that has already been observed
is the only behavior of which a black box is capable, but Moore’s theorem reminds us that
this is always merely an hypothesis. The very next observation could prove it wrong.
Moore’s theorem gives hypotheses about the behavior of a black box, whether framed as
input-output “laws” or as proposed internal mechanisms, exactly the status that Popper
[78] gives scientific hypotheses in general: they are candidates for empirical falsification.
They are at best satisficing, not optimal. To borrow Bell’s [13] somewhat pejorative term,
they may be true FAPP, but they can never be considered true simpliciter. They cannot,
therefore, support the weight of metaphysical or ontological claims. As noted above, onto-
logical claims about physical boundaries and hence physical structure inside a black box fall
immediately afoul of decompositional equivalence. Moore’s theorem generalizes this prohi-
bition of ontology to internal structures described in any language. Explicitly hypothetical
claims—models—of course suffer no such prohibition. Provisional or FAPP “knowledge”
of the workings of a black box—the kind of knowledge represented by not-yet-disconfirmed
models, is allowed by Moore as it is by Popper; it is certain or god’s-eye knowledge that is
prohibited.
3.2 A Black Box Cannot Be Bounded
Moore’s theorem provides the basis from which to prove the principle result of this paper:
that a black box cannot be bounded. The informal “picture” of a black box found in the
classical cybernetics literature (e.g., [1, 77]) or in Figure 1 places the observer outside the
box. The box is, in the canonical example, a device captured from an enemy and given to an
engineer to investigate, or in a design example, a device about which only the input-output
interface is known. In either case, the box is bounded, clearly separate from and causally
independent of the other items in the laboratory or workshop. The following theorem shows
that this traditional, intuitively-appealing picture is seriously misleading.
Theorem (no-boundary): If the observable world contains a black box, it is a black box.
To prove this theorem, it is useful to introduce the following:
Definition: Let B be a black box and ξ be an arbitrarily-chosen observable degree of
freedom. The degree of freedom ξ is separable from B if and only every state of B is
independent of the state of ξ.
This is the definition of separability familiar from physics (cf. Section 2.1), phrased from
the perspective of B. The proof is now simple: Moore’s Theorem shows that knowing that
ξ is separable from B is knowing more than can be known.
Proof : If the observable world contains a black box B, but is not itself a black box, it must
contain at least one observable degree of freedom ξ that is separable from B. If this is the
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case, all states of B and therefore the complete machine table of B must be independent
of the state of ξ. This, however, is by Moore’s theorem information about B that cannot
be obtained by finite observation, contradicting the assumption that B is a black box. 
This no-boundary theorem confirms in general—taking it as obvious that the world con-
tains at least one black box—the conclusion reached above from the observer as witness
formulation and from decompositional equivalence: each observer obtains information only
at her boundary with the surrounding “environment”, i.e., the rest of her observable uni-
verse. This environment is a black box. The systems it contains, if any, are not accessible
for direct observation.
The no-boundary theorem appears radical, but it is not. Indeed it rests not on a strong
underlying assumption, but on the absence of one: the proof would not go through if it
were permitted to assume, a priori, that systems are separable. In this case B could be
assumed, a priori, to be separable from its environment and hence from ξ. The traditional
picture of a black box as a device resting on an engineer’s workbench implicitly makes
this assumption; the engineer in this traditional picture does not need to worry about the
box being dynamically coupled to his heartbeat or to the phases of the Moon. Removing
the assumption of separability turns these worries, however far-fetched they may be, into
real possibilities. If they are to be removed from consideration definitively, not just FAPP,
they must be removed by observational evidence. Moore’s Theorem shows that definitive
observational evidence of independence cannot be obtained by finite means.
The no-boundary theorem moves each observer into an all-encompassing black box, the rest
of that observer’s observable universe (Figure 2). It denies observers independent access to
“systems” embedded within their observable universes; the physical interaction by which
an observer obtains information is defined at the observer—observable universe boundary,
and all information obtained by the observer must cross this boundary. The “source” of
the information within the box cannot be identified, as doing so would require access to
the interior of the box, access that no observer can have.
An immediate consequence of the no-boundary theorem is that the composite observer-box
system is, from the observer’s point of view, a closed system. The observer cannot, in
particular, detect anything else that interacts with the box; the box is all she sees. The
closure of the composite observer-box system is only a fact FAPP, but it is, for the observer,
a conclusion that no observation can falsify.
The no-boundary theorem does not, of course, limit the observer’s ability to hypothesize the
existence of distinct “systems” within the black box that constitutes her observable universe.
Nor does it imply that such hypotheses cannot be useful FAPP for choosing what inputs to
give the box or for predicting what outputs to expect from the box. It merely establishes
the Popperian point that while such hypotheses can be supported by observation, they can
never be confirmed by observation. They cannot, therefore, support ontological claims.
In particular, they cannot be regarded as “self-evident truths” and accorded the status of
axioms. “Systems exist” is sometimes regarded as an axiom of quantum theory [39, 79]. As
discussed in more detail below, the apparent existence of distinct physical systems should
instead be regarded as an explanadum of quantum theory.
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Figure 2: The observer within the black box. (a) The observer is embedded within “the
rest of the observable universe”, which by Theorem 2 is a black box; (b) The observer is
embedded within the environment postulated by the environment as witness formulation of
decoherence, from which any information about systems embedded within that environment
must be obtained; (c) The observer is embedded within an observable universe that satisfies
decompositional equivalence. Subsystem boundaries (other than the observer’s) within that
universe have no effect on the information that the observer can obtain.
3.3 Corollaries
The no-boundary theorem shows that separability between any two observable degrees
of freedom, i.e., between any two components of the state(s) of one or more systems, is
at best a FAPP assumption. Separability is, however, the fundamental enabling assump-
tion of the “classical worldview” of independently-observable, independently-manipulable
physical objects. Einstein put it this way: “Without such an assumption of the mutually
independent existence (the “being-thus”) of spatially distant things, an assumption which
originates in everyday thought, physical thought in the sense familiar to us would not be
possible”. (quoted in [79], p. 6). Separability underpins the concept of statistical inde-
pendence and, therefore, Bell’s [80] inequality. If the observable universe is a black box,
the idea that any two observable degrees of freedom would satisfy Bell’s inequality is at
best a FAPP assumption. There is no reason for it to be true, and no justifications be-
yond FAPP utility and convenience for assuming that it is true. The no-boundary theorem
tells us, indeed, to expect Bell’s inequality to be violated, the surprise elicited in fact by
experimental confirmations of its violation by Aspect, Dalibard and Roger [81] and now
many others notwithstanding. It is important to emphasize that this expectation follows
purely and solely from classical cybernetics. No “quantum” assumptions are needed. If
“physical thought in the sense familiar to us” is not possible without separability, then it
is not possible even in classical physics.
As shown previously [82], the restrictions on inferences from observational outcomes im-
posed by Bell’s theorem [80], the Kochen-Specker theorem [83] and the no-cloning theorem
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[84] can also be derived from Moore’s theorem; they therefore characterize any observa-
tions of a black box. The no-boundary theorem shows that the restrictions imposed by
these theorems characterize observations across the board. In every case, these restric-
tions follow from the inability of observers to identify the particular collection of degrees of
freedom within the black box under observation—the particular embedded “system”—that
produced a given observational outcome. If the sources of observational outcomes cannot
be singled out, i.e., if separability fails, then outcomes that appear to come from two dis-
tinct systems cannot be assumed to be independent (Bell’s theorem), outcomes that appear
to come from a single system cannot be assumed to be independent of the order in which
they are obtained (Kochen-Specker), and identical outcomes do not indicate the presence
of identical systems (no cloning). This last result is simply a special case of Moore’s the-
orem: no two finite sequences of observational outcomes obtained from two black boxes
can demonstrate that the two black boxes have the same machine table, i.e., no two such
sequences of observational outcomes can demonstrate that two black boxes are clones. This
and the other results are, once again, consequences of classical cybernetics alone. That they
were discovered in the context of quantum systems, and that they are still often regarded as
“intrinsically quantum” (e.g., [85] where Bell’s theorem is regarded as “intrinsically quan-
tum” although the Kochen-Specker and no-cloning theorems are not), indicate the depth
with which the view that the observable universe cannot be a black box pervades “classical”
thinking, i.e., the extent to which the decompositional equivalence of the classical formalism
is ignored.
Several additional corollaries follow immediately from the no-boundary theorem.
Corollary (no-communication): Two or more observers cannot employ their shared envi-
ronment as a classical communication channel.
Proof : By the no-boundary theorem, the environment shared by two or more observers
is a black box. No observer of this black box can determine the internal source or causal
history of any output received from the box. Therefore, no observer can distinguish states
of the box that result from inputs from other observers from states of the box that have no
dependence on inputs from the other observers. 
It cannot, in other words, be determined by finite observation that an output from a black
box is a “message” from another observer. Indeed from the point of view of any one
observer, all other observers are inside that observer’s observable universe and hence inside
a black box (Fig. 3).
The no-communication corollary is analogous to the no-communication theorem for shared
quantum systems [86], which shows that the local measurement outcomes obtained from
a quantum system by one observer cannot depend on the activities of another observer,
located somewhere else, who also interacts with the system. This latter result is gener-
ally interpreted as a limitation on instantaneous information transfer between observers
via the shared quantum system, i.e., as showing that entanglement cannot be used for
super-luminal communication. However, spacelike-separated observers can obtain no direct
observational evidence that they are manipulating the same system; it is for this reason that
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Figure 3: (a) Two observers, Alice and Bob, interact with a black box; (b) It is equivalent
to regard Alice as interacting with a black box that contains Bob, and Bob as interacting
with a black box that contains Alice. It is clear in this latter picture that Alice cannot
determine by observation that an output from her box is a message from Bob, nor can Bob
determine by observation that an output from his box is a message from Alice.
local observations must be supplemented with classical communication via a separate clas-
sical channel in communication protocols (local observations, classical communication or
“LOCC” protocols [87]) that depend on shared quantum systems and hence entanglement
as a resource. If only a quantum system is shared, classical communication is impossible
and no information can be exchanged, i.e., entanglement ceases to be a resource.
If observers cannot exchange classical information through a shared black box, they clearly
cannot exchange physical systems either. Physical systems such as clocks, meter sticks
and gyroscopes are, however, the reference frames with respect to which measurements are
made [88]. Hence we have:
Corollary (no-external-reference): Observers have no access to external reference frames.
Proof : By the no-boundary theorem, any external reference frame is inside a black box
and therefore inaccessible. 
In particular, observers cannot specifically and exclusively consult external clocks, spatial
reference frames, or items of laboratory apparatus, as all of these are internal to the black
box with which each observer interacts. Information from such devices can only be ob-
tained if it is “packaged” into an output from the black box. By the definition of a black
box, this packaging process precludes observational access to the source(s) of the packaged
information.
The no-external-reference corollary seems radical, but in fact has a simple interpretation:
the reference frames employed by observers to make sense of their observations must be
internal. Without an internal representation of time, for example, the motion of a clock
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hand has no temporal meaning; without an internal memory and an internal means of com-
paring current and remembered events, even the motion itself is undetectable. Observers,
in other words, cannot be “blank slates” that just record data if they are to obtain what
Roederer has called “pragmatic information”, information that enables doing something
[89, 90]. An observer’s internal reference frames determine what kinds of outputs from a
black box that observer can observe. They allow the interpretation of observed outputs in
terms of hypotheses about the box’s states and dynamics. Without such internal reference
frames, the observer cannot do science, indeed the observer cannot do anything at all. It
was assumed earlier that observers could choose what to do next; this assumption can now
be re-stated as the assumption that all observers of interest have internal reference frames,
including in particular an internal time reference frame, that enable them to obtain and
act on pragmatic information (cf. [64]).
If observers have internal structure, it is natural to ask if that internal structure is accessible
to other observers. The no-boundary theorem restricts this question to one case only: the
case in which the “other observer” in question is the black box with which the observer of
interest interacts. In this case, however, the answer has already been decided: the black
box obtains only a finite sequence of finite bits strings from the observer. The situation
shown in Figure 1a is, therefore, completely symmetrical: the black box can “know” no
more about the observer than the observer can know about the black box. Hence we have:
Corollary (observer-box equivalence): Observers are black boxes and vice-versa.
Proof : Consider an observer (Alice) interacting with a black box B that contains another
observer (Bob) as shown in Figure 3b. Because Bob’s presence within B is undetectable by
Alice, this situation is completely general. By the no-boundary theorem, the outputs from
B cannot depend on Bob’s boundary, therefore it can expand arbitrarily within B (Figure
4). In the limit, Bob and B are identical. 
This observer-box equivalence corollary extends Ashby’s remark about “real objects or sys-
tems” to include observers, an extension that comports well with Ashby’s lifelong commit-
ment to understanding biological intelligence in terms of adaptive information processing
[91]. It removes, in particular, any justification for assuming that observers are made out of
a different kind of “stuff” or have an intrinsically different structure from the environments
in which they are embedded. It allows the boundary around an observer embedded in a
black box to be erased; i.e., it recognizes that a black box containing an observer satisfies
decompositional equivalence.
The observer-box equivalence corollary allows us to re-conceptualize the observer-box in-
teraction as an interaction between two observers or, equivalently, between two black boxes
(Figure 5). The observers/boxes together comprise a closed system, a “universe” in which
each observer/box is the other observer/box’s “environment” or observable universe. Clas-
sical information exchanged by the observers flows through an inter-observer boundary S,
which plays the role of a classical information channel. As this boundary is an oriented
surface separating the observers, both the information sent and the information received by
each observer can be viewed as “written on” the side of this surface facing that observer.
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Figure 4: (a) Alice interacts with a black box containing Bob, as in Fig. 3b; (b) Bob’s
boundary within the box can expand arbitrarily without affecting the box’s interaction with
Alice; (c) In the limit, Bob and the box are identical.
20
Figure 5: Alice and Bob exchange classical information through an inter-observer boundary
S.
Sending and receiving are symmetric, so each observer “sees” exactly the same information
on their own side of the surface; they differ only in the labelling of what bits have been
“sent” and what bits have been “received”. As there is no process by which to “unsend” or
“unreceive” a message, this “writing” on S is permanent. Indeed the “memories” of both
Alice and Bob can, without loss of generality, be regarded as implemented by their shared
boundary.
If two observers/boxes, e.g., Alice and Bob in Figure 5, are allowed to interact indefinitely,
the amount of information encoded on the inter-observer boundary S will increase, limited
only by the assumed-finite energy resources of the observers. Let EMax(O) be the maximum
energy available to an observer O for information exchange.
Definition: LetA andB be interacting black boxes that together comprise a closed system,
and suppose they are allowed to interact indefinitely. The observable machine tables of A
and B are then the exactly complementary sequences of inputs and outputs exchanged by
A and B prior to the smaller of EMax(A) and EMax(B) being exhausted.
The observable machine table of a black box can clearly be its complete machine table if its
number of states is small. If energy resources are unlimited, the observable machine table
of a finite black box is the complete machine table. If both black boxes are infinite and can
access infinite energy, completeness is approached only as a limit.
Corollary (holographic-encoding): If a black box is a component of a closed system, its
observable machine table can be written on its boundary.
Proof : Let B be the black box in question. If B is itself a closed system, it has no boundary
but also no inputs or outputs, so it has no observable machine table. If B together with one
other black box compose a closed system, the result follows by definition of the observable
machine table. If B interacts with more than one other black box, the no-boundary theorem
allows their union to be considered a single black box, so the previous case applies. 
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The holographic-encoding corollary provides an alternative way of thinking about the “in-
accessible interior” of a black box: to say that the interior of a black box is inaccessible is
just to say that all available information about the box can be “read off” from its exterior.
Physical systems for which this is true are obviously familiar: they are black holes. In the
case of a black hole, the information written on the horizon S is proportional to its mass
[92]. In the case of a black box, the information written on the horizon S is proportional to
its available energy (and hence its mass) or to its behavioral and hence computational com-
plexity, whichever is less. The connection between mass, horizon-encoded information and
computational complexity has been noted previously in the case of black holes [93, 63]; it is
interesting to see it re-appear here in the purely-classical case of black boxes. While in the
black-hole case the computational complexity in question is the computational complexity
faced by an observer stationed near the horizon who must analyze Hawking radiation from
the black hole before it evaporates, in the black box case the computational complexity
in question is the computational complexity of the procedure with which the box chooses
outputs in response to inputs. It can be conjectured that the two cases are in fact fully
analogous: that the computational complexity of an observer’s analysis of Hawking radi-
ation mirrors the computational complexity of the black hole’s “choice” of what Hawking
radiation to emit.
The holographic-encoding corollary holds for black boxes, or by the observer-box equiv-
alence corollary, observers that are components of closed systems. As noted earlier, a
system being closed can only be a fact FAPP. All systems appear, however, to be closed
to observers embedded in them. Hence all observers appear, to themselves, to have their
observable machine tables encoded as memories on their boundaries.
It was remarked in the Introduction that modern science assumes that “there is a way
that the world works”. This assumption is naturally interpreted, and historically has been
interpreted, as an assumption of determinism. Standard quantum theory with no physical
“collapse” process is fully unitary and therefore strictly deterministic. As noted earlier,
Tipler has shown that the “quantum potential” that the Schro¨dinger equation adds to
the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation is exactly the potential required to make classical
physics strictly deterministic [25]. Let us assume, therefore, that the dynamics of any closed
system is strictly deterministic. Even in this case, the following holds:
Corollary (free-will): In a closed system comprising two interacting black boxes, neither
box determines the other’s behavior.
Proof : For one box to determine the other’s behavior, it must have information specifying
the other’s state and dynamics. However, such information cannot be obtained for any
black box. 
This free-will corollary is an analog for black boxes of the Conway-Kochen free-will the-
orem, which states that the behavior of a quantum system cannot be determined by the
information available in its own past lightcone [94]. While quantum theory can be glob-
ally deterministic, no local information can be determinative for any system. It is in this
sense of local non-determinism that any observer/box can be said to “freely choose” its
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next output (cf. [95]). Note that this freedom also applies to each observer’s own local
information: as each observer’s memory contains only its own observable machine table, no
observer “knows” its own current state or dynamics and hence no observer can locally de-
termine its own next output. Observers are free and appear autonomous, but they are not
autonomous in the literal sense of locally self-determining; local non-determinism includes
local non-self -determinism. Local non-determinism prevents strict “objective” autonomy
for any bounded system, including any observer, but requires apparent autonomy for all
observed systems, including all observers. Local non-determinism can be stated in terms
of decompositional equivalence: any system’s action on its observed world, including any
observer’s action on her observed world, remains the same when the boundary around the
system/observer is erased, rendering the action no longer the system’s/observer’s action on
the observed world but rather the entire world’s action on itself. Within a black-box based
theory, these two actions are indistinguishable.
3.4 What is Physics about?
The no-go results demonstrated here, whether in their current classical cybernetic form
or in their more traditional quantum-information form, naturally raise the question of
what physics is about. This question has traditionally been debated in realist-versus-
instrumentalist terms, with the added twist of realists about the “quantum world” typi-
cally being instrumentalists about the “classical world” and vice-versa (e.g., [6] or for a
more recent survey of competing positions, [12]). The no-boundary theorem and the no-
communication corollary add a further issue to this debate: that of observations being
intrinsically personal. This individuality and principled non-redundancy of observations
has previously been emphasized by Fuchs as a central feature of quantum Bayesianism [11].
If communications from other observers are regarded as “observations” like any others and
accorded no special, epistemically-privileged status, the usual notion of objectivity based
on inter-subjective agreement breaks down. It becomes impossible for the agreeing agents
to establish unambiguously what they are agreeing about (cf. [66]). They can agree FAPP,
but they can do no better than this.
The concept of classical information—information that can be irreversibly encoded as a bit
string on some physical medium—is taken as a primitive in classical cybernetics and in the
current discussion. Bits are discrete “quanta” of information; hence classical information is
itself “quantized”. As noted above, any observer able to obtain classical information and use
it to make predictions must have an internal time reference frame, i.e., an internal clock. No
generality is lost in assuming that the observer’s internal clock “ticks” whenever an outcome
is received from the system being observed; the unit time interval of the observer’s internal
clock can, therefore, be set to ∆t = 1. As the observer must expend a minimum energy
EMin = ln2 kT to record each bit, the observer’s minimal action per recorded outcome is
EMin∆t. Hence the observer’s action is quantized even in classical physics. Boltzmann’s
recognition that obtaining information requires expending energy is thus the fundamental
idea needed to develop quantum theory. The quantization EMin∆t = Constant fixes the
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value of the minimal action; at human physiological temperature, T = 310 K, for example,
and ∆t ∼ 200 ns, the response time of rhodopsin to light at physiological temperature [96],
EMin∆t ∼ 6.0× 10
−34 J · s, a value remarkably close to Planck’s h ∼ 6.6× 10−34 J · s.
As Jennings and Leifer have shown [85], the quantization of the observer’s action is sufficient
to understand the non-commutativity of position and momentum measurements and the
position-momentum uncertainty principle, as well as no-cloning, Kochen-Specker contextu-
ality, and other “quantum” effects. While Jennings and Leifer do not ask what additional
assumptions are needed to obtain all of quantum theory within a classical setting, others
have done so. As Tipler shows, requiring time evolution to be strictly deterministic is
sufficient [25]; Bohmian mechanics provides a similar demonstration from a different start-
ing point, that of preserving quantum behavior while assuming an ontology of classical
“particles” [26]. Motivated in part by Wheeler’s provocative “it from bit” proposal [97],
a number of information-theoretic [98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103] or more generally, opera-
tional [104, 105, 106] axiomatizations of quantum theory have been proposed. Within these
formulations, “physical” interactions become transformations of bits, typically with qubits
as “inside the box” intermediaries. Hence physics in these formulations is “about” computa-
tion, typically quantum computation. Reviewing “device-independent” operational meth-
ods originating in quantum cryptography, which disallow assumptions about the degrees
of freedom or dynamics of the systems from which observational outcomes are obtained,
Grinbaum goes even farther, concluding that physics is “about languages” ([107], p. 14),
specifically, languages as formal entities without imposed semantics.
Physics being about information, computation or languages is a far cry from the more tra-
ditional, and far more common, view that physics is about the everyday objects of ordinary
human experience, even if its theories tend toward the abstruse and postulate non-ordinary
objects that are not directly observed. Effectively embedding the human observer into
the theory requires explaining, within the theory, why the everyday observations made by
human observers can be described so readily in terms of bounded, causally-independent
objects. The next section makes a step in this direction by showing that “objects” can be
considered to be collections of outcome values that are held fixed while making measure-
ments. “Objects” are thus internal reference frames. It is then shown in Section 5 that
objects construed in this way are the natural external referents of the “object tokens” that
have been proposed as components of human episodic memories [108, 109].
4 “Objects” within a Black Box
The world may be a black box, but when human observers look at it, they see discrete
objects. The “environment” in which these objects are embedded is effectively invisible,
a condition that has obtained, cosmologically, since photons decoupled from matter [110].
Hence while human observers physically interact with the environment, predominately the
ambient photon field, they see objects. From the present perspective, the question of
interest is how to describe these objects in a way that is consistent with the Black Box
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model.
4.1 Object Identification in Practice
The almost-automatic human assumption that distinct objects exist in an observer-independent
“objective” way within the world diverts attention away from a question that is critical for
understanding observation: how does an observer identify the object being observed? How,
for example, does one identify a familiar object like a coffee cup? Such objects do not
appear to us in isolation; they must be picked out from scenes that contain many other
objects. The only incoming information available for doing so is that contained in the
observational outcomes obtained from the scene as a whole.
As will be discussed further in Section 5 below, answering this system-identification ques-
tion is non-trivial [111]. For the present purposes, however, the most important part of
the answer is that observers must dedicate some of the observational outcomes that they
associate with an object to its identification, leaving the rest to indicate its state. A coffee
cup, for example, may be identified by its fixed size, shape and color, while its location and
whether it is filled with coffee are allowed to vary, i.e., to be state variables. What is critical
is that not all observables associated with an object can simultaneously be state variables ;
some must be set aside for object identification. Coffee cups are in this sense like electrons:
some observable properties must be regarded as definitional and hence invariant in order
for system identification to succeed.
Recognizing that system identification requires a designated collection of observables that
are fixed and invariant destroys a key component of the “classical worldview”. Ollivier,
Poulin and Zurek, for example, operationally define objectivity thus ([42], p. 3):
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about the
system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
This definition clearly applies to no systems at all, as observers “without prior knowledge
about the system” would have no designated observables with which to identify it and
observers “without prior agreement” about a designated collection of identifying observables
would have no basis for any subsequent agreement. The no-external-reference corollary
shows that the reference frames required to characterize system states must be included
within the “prior knowledge” of observers; inter-observer agreement about reference frames
must, similarly, be included among the “prior agreements” between observers. Shared
conceptual schemes and shared category hierarchies are examples of such prior agreements.
As discussed in more detail below, the collection of observable properties that are regarded
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as defining an object can be considered a reference frame for characterizing that object:
without agreement about which observables constitute a reference frame for identifying
an object, multiple observers cannot agree unambiguously about object identification. As
noted earlier, a critically important special case is the collection of reference frames that
observers use to identify each other, including their prior agreements about how they will
communicate.
4.2 Superpositions Encode the Unresolvable Ambiguity of Object
Identification
The role of observational outcomes in identifying objects can be illustrated with a sim-
ple thought experiment. Consider an observer equipped with a single reference frame, a
vertically-oriented meter stick, who is embedded in a world containing multiple objects,
some of which have some linear dimension equal, within the resolution of the meter stick,
to 1 m while others do not (Figure 6). The meter stick registers a “1” outcome if it comes
into contact with an object having a vertical dimension of 1 m and registers a “0” outcome
if it comes into contact with an object having a different vertical dimension; it registers no
outcome if it is not in contact with an object. An unseen mechanism occasionally puts one
of the objects in contact with the meter stick. The observer receives no information other
than the “1” and “0” outcomes from the meter stick; in particular, the observer is unable
to observe the size, shape, orientation, or anything else about the objects other than the
vertical linear dimension reported by the meter stick. The world of this observer is clearly
a black box.
With what system does the observer interact when an outcome value of “1” is received?
The observed state of that system is known: it is whatever state yields an outcome value
of “1.” Call this state “|1〉” and call its complement, the state that yields an outcome
value of “0”, “|0〉.” What, however, is the system that occupies these states? While the
no-boundary theorem gives the precise answer that the “system” is the black-box world
as a whole, the human tendency to associate distinct observational outcomes with distinct
systems suggests an answer postulating two systems, an “object” S1 perpetually in, and
hence identified by |1〉 and a second “object” S2 perpetually in and identified by |0〉. These
two alternatives are operationally equivalent: interacting with a single system that can
occupy two states is indistinguishable from interacting with two systems, each of which
permanently occupies a single state.
From the “god’s eye” perspective of Figure 6, one can associate multiple distinct objects
distinguished by the unobserved and hence “hidden” variable of geometric shape with both
S1 and S2. Providing the observer in Figure 6 with a shape detector would allow a choice
between identifying objects by size and treating shape as a state variable or identifying
objects by shape and treating size as a state variable. These descriptions are, once again,
operationally equivalent, and both are equivalent to a description in which there is only
one object—the black box—and both size and shape are state variables. The only basis
for predictions in any of these descriptions is the sequence of bit strings observed so far,
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Figure 6: (a) An observer equipped with a meter stick and embedded in a world of multiple
objects. The meter stick reports an outcome of “1” whenever an object with a linear
dimension of 1 m is placed in contact with it. The observer has no ability to observe any
features of the objects other than the linear dimension reported by the meter stick; (b) The
meter stick reports an outcome of “0” whenever an object with a linear dimension other
than 1 m is placed in contact with it; (c) A mechanism that places successive objects in
contact with the meter stick produces a stream of binary outcome values.
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a sequence that provides no information beyond a lower bound on complexity about the
mechanism that selects objects to put in contact with the meter stick. In particular, the
observations provide no basis for deciding whether the mechanism selects “objects” for
presentation at random or by following a deterministic algorithm.
It is natural for an observer who knows no more about what is being observed than the
observational outcomes obtained thus far to represent the source of these outcomes, what-
ever it is, by a linear superposition of the observed outcomes. As distinct outcomes can
indicate either distinct states or distinct systems, this representation can be interpreted as
either a superposition of states or as a superposition of systems; the two interpretations are
entirely equivalent [67]. While the former is by far the more familiar, the latter is implicit
in Feynman diagrams and is even more evident in more abstract representations, such as
the amplituhedron [112], in which particles and even spacetime are elided altogether.
4.3 Objects as Internal Reference Frames
It is increasingly recognized that the reference frames employed to make physical measure-
ments are not mere abstracta but rather are physical objects [88]. Successfully employing a
LOCC protocol with entangled photons, for example, requires sharing not just a description
of the measurement conditions at the two spatially-separated sites, but also a physical ori-
entation reference frame such as the Earth’s gravitational field. The physicality of reference
frames forces the physicality of instrument calibration procedures to be taken explicitly into
account; when this is done, the standard “quantum” uncertainty relations emerge even for
purely classical measurements [113]. The complementarity between system-identifying ob-
servables and state observables makes it clear why this must be the case across the board:
one or the other set of observables must be measured first, and the finite time required
for measurement is time during which the unmeasured observables are free to undergo
unpredictable dynamic evolution.
The no-external-reference corollary shows, however, that reference frames cannot be exter-
nal physical objects; they must be internal to the observer. Even an external calibration
standard requires identification by observation: from the observer’s perspective, it is merely
a collection of observational outcomes. Calibration itself is a process of comparing observa-
tional outcomes that identify and characterize the state of the “standard” to observational
outcomes that identify and characterize the state of the “instrument” being calibrated. This
comparison is an operation on bit strings carried out by the observer; it is a computation.
It is essential to the meaning of this computation that the outcomes that identify both the
calibration standard and the instrument remain invariant during the calibration process.
As with the fixed size, shape and color of a coffee cup that enable reaching for it, grasping
it, and filling it with coffee, it is the invariance of outcomes that identify objects with re-
spect to outcomes that indicate changes of state that allow state changes to be recognized
as such.
If all objects, including objects that function as calibration standards and reference frames,
are identified by sets of observational outcomes that remain invariant while other relevant
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observational outcomes change, it is natural to consider these sets of invariant outcomes
to be the internal reference frames that the no-external-reference corollary requires. These
internal reference frames are information-bearing structures—effectively, data structures—
that encode the observer’s expectations about the objects present “within” the black box
under observation. In Bayesian predictive-coding [114] terms, they are prior probability
distributions. Without such priors, the observer cannot identify objects, and hence cannot
recognize state changes in objects.
There is, however, no need to postulate the real existence of external objects at all; the no-
boundary theorem guarantees that their existence cannot be revealed by observation. Any
observer’s observational outcomes are generated by that observer’s impenetrable black box.
The observer encoding a set of internal reference frames that identify objects is all that is
required to explain the appearance, to the observer, of objects within the box (von Foerster
[17] refers to such internal reference frames as “eigenforms”; see also [115, 116]). Hence
the observer encoding a set of internal reference frames is all that physics needs postulate.
Internal reference frames are necessary for object perception in a black-box world; they are
also sufficient.
5 The Black Box as a Cross-Disciplinary Paradigm
The assumption that the sources, within the world, of observational outcomes can be spa-
tially localized and bounded is central to the classical worldview. It goes hand-in-hand
with the assumption that specific states of spatially localized, bounded systems can be
“prepared” by local manipulations. The classical cybernetics of the mid-20th century was
by no means the first or the only intellectual movement to question these assumptions.
Philosophers have criticized them at least since Heraclitus. The 20th century saw, however,
an explosion of criticism of these assumptions that ranged across scientific disciplines. As
science requires replicable experiments performed on shareable apparatus and reported on
shareable media, this burst of criticism of the assumptions on which these conditions rest
indicate that the logic of science itself is at most paraconsistent [117].
5.1 Formal Semantics, Device Independence and Virtual Ma-
chines
By the 1930s, Wittgenstein’s essentially 19th-century conception of propositions in natural
or formal languages “picturing” unique relations between independently-existing objects
[118] had been largely replaced, in no small part due to Wittgenstein’s own efforts, by a
radically different conception of languages and of symbol systems generally as supporting
arbitrarily many distinct interpretations. This view reached maturity in Tarski’s develop-
ment of formal model theory as a general approach to semantics [119]; however, it is evident
in the Turing machine [120] and in the work of Go¨del, Church and others. Via the later
work of Quine and others, the disconnection of semantics from syntax imposed by formal
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model theory informs all recent thinking about natural languages. The implications of this
break for ontology have not gone unnoticed. Quine, for example, points out that with
this disconnection, “physical objects are postulated entities which round out, and simplify
our account of the flux of experience ... the conceptual scheme of physical objects is a
convenient myth, simpler than the literal truth” ([121], p. 32). Physical objects are, in
other words, for Quine just semantic interpretations of the observational outcomes that
constitute “the flux of experience.” Experience itself is experience of a black box.
The most powerful practical impact of the idea that symbols could support arbitrarily
many distinct interpretations was in computer science; indeed it can be argued that the
disconnection of syntax and hence implementation from semantics is the foundational idea
of computer science. It enables the two defining characteristics of post-1950s computing:
device independence (the same software can run on arbitrarily many distinct hardware
platforms) and virtual machines (a single hardware system, appropriately programmed,
can exhibit the input-output behaviors of arbitrarily many distinct devices). These two
concepts are closely coupled: virtual machines, in the form of interpreters and compilers,
enable device independence, while device independence is what makes virtual machines so
useful and valuable [122, 123]. Without these concepts, we would still be programming
special-purpose computers by re-arranging their hardware. With them, we are able to
regard a device that fits comfortably in a shirt pocket as performing the specialized functions
of hundreds to thousands of different tools.
Despite its everyday familiarity within computer science, the virtual machine concept has
yet to penetrate the disciplinary discourse of physics. “Device-independent methods,” how-
ever, are virtual machine methods. An experimenter who “prepares” the state of a quantum
system is in fact preparing the state of a virtual machine, often literally in a computer-
controlled laboratory. “Experimental data” are, similarly, outputs of virtual machines,
again often literally. From the experimenter’s point of view, these virtual machines are
black boxes, in many cases black boxes that are literally functionally interchangeable, and
in practice regularly interchanged, with other black boxes that offer the same functional-
ity FAPP. What goes on in the interiors of these black boxes is unknown, and in many
cases arguably unknowable, even in principle, by human beings [124]. To do an experi-
ment is, therefore, to undertake an extended exercise in semantic interpretation of observa-
tional outcomes obtained from unknown and (at least FAPP but very possibly in principle)
unknowable sources. While some “physical reality” or other must be postulated for the
exercise to make sense, the observational outcomes obtained leave this reality arbitrarily
underspecified. All of physics, in other words, is device-independent by its very nature.
Experimentally-accessible “physical systems” are bits of semantics, or as Grinbaum [107]
puts it, bits of language.
5.2 Cognitive Science and AI
The 1960s “cognitive revolution” in psychology reintroduced the idea that understanding
what is going on inside the subject’s—i.e., the observer’s—head is important for understand-
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ing the subject’s behavior. Mere stimulus-response laws are not sufficient [125]. Cognitive
subjects are, however, notoriously black boxes: the observational tools available to experi-
mental psychology and neuroscience do not directly reveal either the contents of cognition
or the processes that manipulate those contents. In particular, they do not reveal the rela-
tionship between cognitive states and states of the external world. The question of whether
this semantic relationship can be considered fixed by causal processes and hence unique
underlies the “symbol grounding problem” (SGP) [126, 127] in cognitive science and AI.
As “grounding” a symbol in the external world requires identifying the object, event, or
class of objects or events to which it refers, the external SGP is equivalent to the problem
of object or system identification [128]. Responses to the SGP range from treating the
observer’s world as a black box, at least methodologically [129], to considering essentially
arbitrary components of the state of the world as components of the observer’s cognitive
state [130]. The former response replicates the conceptual structure of Figure 5; the latter
reinforces the arbitrariness with which the observer-world boundary is drawn.
While symbol grounding can be viewed as a purely theoretical or even philosophical problem
in cognitive science, it becomes a practical problem in AI, particularly for “embodied” and
“situated” systems such as mobile robots [131]. In “open” task environments in which
not all objects can be identified using a priori knowledge, object identification criteria and
hence the “grounds” for object-specifying symbols must be learned. How such criteria can
be learned, even just FAPP, is a central problem in both developmental robotics [132] and
developmental psychology [111]. Internally grounding object symbols in object-appropriate,
context-relative perceptual-motor associations provides a FAPP solution to the SGP; this
solution effectively replicates the embedding relationship between object tokens [108] and
event files [133] or episodic memories [134] in theories of human object recognition [109].
The external or ontological version of the SGP is widely regarded as both unsolvable and
irrelevant to practical robotics [135]. Rejecting the external SGP as a problem for robotics
is considering the world in which a robot behaves to be a black box.
5.3 Evolution and Development
Cognitive scientists who reject a black-box view of the observer-world interaction often
appeal to biological evolution as a mechanism for enforcing a causal connection between
world states and cognitive states. Mark, Marion and Hoffman have, however, shown using
evolutionary game simulations that agents responsive only to fitness payoffs out-compete
agents responsive to the actual distribution of resources in a simulated world [136]. This
result motivates the “interface theory of perception” (ITP), which conceptualizes percep-
tual systems as providing finite-resolution information about the fitness consequences of
actions in a black-box world [137]. Within ITP, the semantic relation between the agent’s
internal representations and the world states or structures to which fitness consequences are
associated is essentially arbitrary, as expected within a model-theoretic or virtual-machine
formulation of the semantics. The principle of “conscious realism” of Hoffman and Prakash
[138], which treats an agent’s world as another agent and hence treats agent-world games
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as two-agent games, replicates the symmetric structure of Figure 5 within ITP.
While ITP is explicit in conceptualizing perception and hence cognition as interaction with
a black box, it is not alone in making this assumption. The Bayesian predictive coding
framework [114] provides an organizing principle for not only neurocognitive architecture
[139], but for the evolution and development of complex biological structures in general
[140]. As Friston et al. point out, the predictive coding framework “only make(s) one
assumption; namely, that the world can be described as a random dynamical system”
([140], p. 9). The world is, in other words, from the observer’s perspective a black box. The
boundary of the box in this formalism is the “Markov blanket” of the observer; the observer
effectively perceives and acts on only the inside surface of this blanket [141], making it an
“interface” in the sense employed by ITP. The interactions of the observer with the blanket
are highly dependent on the observer’s Bayesian priors, i.e., on the observer’s conceptual
and categorical structures; hence they display significant contextuality of the second kind
identified by Kitto [24]. Theoretical approaches to conditions such as autism within the
predictive coding framework (e.g., [142]) emphasize this contextuality.
6 Conclusions
As shown here, the over 60-year-old concept of the Black Box provides a powerful basis
for conceptualizing observer-system interactions. While traditional discussions of the Black
Box placed the observer outside the box, the no-boundary theorem moves the observer
inside the box. Moving the observer inside the box, and then recognizing that the observer-
box boundary is itself arbitrarily movable, leads immediately to no-go theorems of the type
familiar from quantum information theory. The observer-box equivalence corollary then
shows that observers are themselves black boxes, while the holographic-encoding corollary
shows that both observers and their observed worlds are analogous, from an information-
theoretic perspective, to black holes. Physics, therefore, already has a detailed and well
established theory of the observer: the theory of the black hole. Conceptualizing the
observer as a black hole forces observer-observer interactions to be regarded as physical in-
teractions occurring at a defined interface between otherwise mutually-inaccessible systems.
It forces us to acknowledge that we do not know what Schro¨dinger saw when he opened
his infamous box and looked for his cat. We only know what he reported seeing. Indeed
we each only know our own interpretation, based on our own physical interaction with his
physically-tokened report, of what he reported seeing. As Fuchs has pointed out, with this
level of epistemic personalization the usual “measurement problem” of quantum theory
simply disappears [11]. It is no longer unclear why observers report classical outcomes:
only classical outcomes—outcomes encodable by classical bit strings—are recordable in a
thermodynamically-irreversible way, and hence only classical outcomes are reportable. It is
no longer unclear how the measurement basis is chosen: observers deploy the observables
they are able to deploy, represented in the measurement bases they are able to deploy. The
traditional measurement problem is replaced, however, by an even deeper problem: a deep
and in-principle unresolvable ambiguity about both the ontological structure and the state
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of the world. This deep ambiguity is not a “quantum” phenomenon. It follows solely from
classical physics, the classical physics of the Black Box. Had Moore’s theorem been proved
20 years before the development of quantum theory instead of 20 years after, this deeper
problem may have been considered the “measurement problem” all along.
Taking the Black Box seriously as a model of observation not only clarifies the relation
between classical and quantum physics; it also clarifies the relation between physics and
computer science, cognitive science and even biology. It forces physics to view semantics
in model-theoretic terms, and thereby enables physics to view physical systems in virtual-
machine terms. While this view is implicit in computational conceptualizations of physical
dynamics, it typically only appears explicitly in speculations about simulated worlds (e.g.,
[143]). The simulation assumption is, however, not required for the conclusion that any
observer’s observed world is a virtual world. This conclusion requires only that the world
itself, the world in which the observer is embedded, is a black box.
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